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Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Robert C. Ellickson.
Harvard University Press. 1991. $39.95.1
Robert Ellickson has written an interesting and challenging book on the role of
informal cooperation which offers a basis for interdisciplinary dialogue among
lawyers, economists, policy scientists, political theorists and researchers interested
in community and organizational phenomena. Informal cooperation, in the sense
that he uses the idea, is guided not by formal laws and regulations but rather by
social norms and social institutions. Such cooperation is fundamental to voluntary
action.
The first seven chapters are a paradigm of good social science theorizing. The
author introduces an important theoretical issue--in this case, the Coase "Social
Cost" Theorem--and a detailed case example upon which to evaluate the issue.
Coase uses the parable of the Farmer and the Rancher to argue the counterintuitive proposition that when transaction costs are zero, a change in the rule of
liability will have no effect on the allocation of resources. Among legal scholars, the
theorem is a hot potato in the contesting between the "law-and-economics" and
"law-and-society" factions of legal theorists. What is at stake, however, goes well
beyond those local debates, and has major implications and possibilities for
informing future research on nonprofit organizations, voluntary action and
philanthropy.
Ellickson chooses a clever and highly appropriate real-life example, involving
"ranchers" and "farmers" in the northwest sector of Shasta County in Northern
California, a checkerboard of open and closed ranges, fences, roving cattle, and
remarkably uninvolved lawyers and law enforcement agencies. Shasta Countians
have developed a complex culture of cooperation with rules for retrieving stray
cattle, constructing and repairing fences, assigning compensation for damages, and
other relevant norms. In Ellickson’s account, all of this occurs counter to Coasepredictions and almost completely without resort to the law.
Ellickson’s study reaches well beyond its modestly limited presentation in terms
of the legal debate between the law-and-economics and law-and-society views. His is
a full-blown rational-choice model of cooperation, built up not from the usual arid
logic of the armchair theorists but from a challenging real-life example including
full measure of "psychological" and "social" elements like custom, envy, gossip,
ritual and hero-worship. Here is Hardin’s tragic commons in the guise of a cowboy
western not unlike the plot of the Broadway musical Oklahoma: California range
not descending into a Hobbesian war of each against all, nor rescued by the long
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arm of the law, but rather bound tightly together by the informal ("voluntary", that
is, uncoerced) cooperation of neighbors.
NVSQ readers who may be weary (or wary) of the artificiality of this style of
academic discourse and suspicious of the mathematical pyrotechnics which often
accompany it should take heart. Ellickson is no ideologue, and not out to prove his
mathematical prowess. His feet are planted squarely in the reality of the Shasta
County example (with a few enlightening digressions into the whaling industry, the
photocopying practices of professors and other strange customs). Ellickson
interprets many of the cattle practices of Shasta county with the aid of game theory
and his mathematics don’t stray beyond ordinary algebra. In particular, he follows
up on Robert Axelrod’s "Tit-for-Tat" cooperative solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma
with his own interesting "Specialized Labor" game to account, among other things,
for the asymmetric fence-building division of labor among ranchers and their
(typically five-acre) ranchettes.
So why should scholars interested in nonprofit organizations, voluntary action
and philanthropy be interested at all in the Ellickson world of Shasta County? For a
number of reasons, both negative and positive: Negatively, it portrays a social world
without a Third Sector. Cooperation is only among individual property owners.
Although the Shasta County farmers (like American farmers everywhere) are prone
to organize a series of political and self-help associations for petition drives, cattle
retrieval and other forms of community action, these do not figure into the analysis
or theory in any way.
Also, the social world of Shasta County is portrayed as a nearly picture-perfect
Hobbes-Locke world of atomistic (Anglo male) individuals who live on a small set of
traditional ranches and their equally atomistic (equally Anglo, equally male)
neighbors who have moved into the community recently to live on "ranchettes". The
historical backdrop for the case study is the familiar one of male ranchers who
carved civilization out of the apparently empty wilderness, reclaiming the land from
a state of nature with no apparent ecological consequences, and the apparently
complete cooperation of the prior residents (whether Amerindian or Hispanic.) Some
ranchers appear to have families, but, unbelievably, family members other than the
"owners" (pater familias) have no recorded impact upon the law, property or
informal social order of Shasta county. Fathers never send their kids or wives to
retrieve the cows, and the race, religion, and other factors which influence and
condition cooperation in other contexts never enter in. At least one rancher is
"college educated" which seems to increase his cooperation at least to a degree, but
any theoretical implications are lost or ignored.
The rational ranchers of Shasta County are also never portrayed in their full
complexity as citizens, friends and neighbors and consequently, the full implications
for the theory of their choice to be welfare-maximizing in these circumstances (along

with the equally rational choices to be income-maximizing and for the affluent to
forego maximization altogether) are not explored.
At a general level of the guiding theoretical model, Ellickson’s terminology
reduces the complex interactions of self, other and community to a set of slightly
jarring legalisms: "first party control(actor)" and "second party control (person acted
upon)". However, these labeling inadequacies are offset by the detailed discussions
which follow. There are also certain definitional problems: A fence between two
properties is defined as a "public good", yet the public good aspects (e.g., protection
of the community at large from cattle contained by the fence) are not explored. The
discussion concentrates exclusively on the "common goods" implications for the
diads of farmer-neighbors actually separated by any particular fence.
Cooperation in the Ellickson-world of Shasta County does not contain a third
sector or commons, or indeed, any space between the purely public realm of public
law and the private world of the individual landholder’s actions: There is no sharing
of purposes or resources, and a sense of mutuality is variable, although voluntary
cooperation and indigenous norms of justice are clearly evident. The entire nongovernmental social world of families, markets and religious, political, social and
other commons is reduced to Ellickson’s own variant on three sectors: "social forces
(norms)", "organizations (rules)" and "government (law)." There is only one very
brief (and inconclusive) reference to "charity". This seems more a bow to past
preoccupation with charity issues in the rational choice literature than to any
relevance to the overall argument for his theory.
Even so, there is much to be admired here: Ellickson develops his legal analysis
from a complete, real-life case study rather than a set of cardboard cut-out "rational
economic" strawmen. Understandings of the role of cooperation in nonprofit
organizations, voluntary action and philanthropy would benefit from close study of
both the findings and the methodology employed here.
• All those who hope to find solutions to social problems in the adoption of
particular laws or "policies" would do well to study Ellickson (and Axelrod)
more closely: In the real world of Shasta County, people don’t ever appear to
solve their problems through first-order resort to law or policy. Their first
choice is typically resort to informal cooperation and voluntary action.
Further, social policies which embody sanctions typically employ them after
the manner of a single round Tit-For-Tat game, while the problem itself may
be a multi-round game.
• Most important of all for readers of this journal are the implications of
Ellickson’s theory of cooperation for the study of nonprofit organizations.
Organizations are ordinarily created to be "systems of cooperation" in the
words of Chester Barnard’s pioneering theory of organization, but the
descriptive literature documents a vast and sorry history of departures from

that norm. The problems of programs and policies, oligarchic leadership,
bureaucratic empire building and programmatic "turf" all seem strangely
analogous to the cooperation over fences and wandering cows of Shasta
County.

